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 BOOK REVIEWS
 Béatrice Longuenesse, Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics. Translated by Nicole J.
 Simek. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. xxi 4- 246 pp.
 Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics consists of two parts whose composition is
 separated by a decade. The first is a translation of Longuenesse's Hegel et la
 Critique de la Métaphysique (1981), and the second contains two papers from
 the early 1990s. The parts are unified by their subject matter, Hegel's Science of
 Logic y though they differ in that the first deals primarily with the second book of
 Hegel's Logic (the Doctrine of Essence) and the second with the third book (the
 Doctrine of the Concept) . Furthermore, though they are partially unified in
 outlook on Hegel - since both parts take Hegel's relation to Kant to be funda-
 mental - they differ substantially in what they make of that relation. Given con-
 straints of space, I will say only the following about the second part: it contains
 two very good papers that are important reading for anyone interested in the
 relation between Kant and Hegel, and the preface includes a concise and in-
 triguing examination of the difference between the two parts.
 The heart of the book is clearly the first part's leveraging of Hegel's
 relation to Kant to motivate specific readings of the concepts of reflection in
 the Doctrine of Essence. As Longuenesse constructs Hegel's view, it is in oppo-
 sition to both empiricism and dogmatic rationalism. Hegel both denies that
 appearances provide the ultimate foundation or content of thought and that
 there is anything else behind the appearances on which they could be ground-
 ed: "There is nothing other than appearance, nothing beyond appearance.
 And yet, appearance is not what is true" (7). This then leads Hegel to search
 for the principles of unity of objects within appearances, and he frames this
 search by use of the idea of reflection. Engaging with Dieter Henrich 's work,
 Longuenesse traces the development of Hegel's thinking on reflection. At first,
 Hegel thinks of reflection as negative: the understanding's destruction of unity.
 But then he starts to see it as a necessary stage, an indispensable tool for phil-
 osophy. Finally, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, he distinguishes between external
 and absolute reflection, where the latter is reflection not on objects but on
 reflection's own modes of determination, where this is the reflection of their
 content in itself. In terms of the Logic, this notion of absolute reflection entails
 that there is a subject and an object, but the subject is the concept's unifying
 function, and the object is whatever is unified. Reflection is therefore the inter-
 play between the subjective activity of unification of determinations and the
 resistance of those determinations, and thus reflection is an element of the
 absolute: "The dimension of alterity and the discrete concatenation of determi-
 nations subsists in reflection. But this alterity is the alterity of thought within
 itself, and the concatenation of determinations is guided by an immanent uni-
 fying ground" (33). To say that reflection is a positive element in the Absolute
 destroys pre-Kantian metaphysics because we no longer look for the "ontologi-
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 cal secret" (Hyppolite) behind the appearances - but rather within appearan-
 ces "for the movement of thought by which the determinations of things that a
 non-critical thought takes to be ontological (or in Kant's words, transcenden-
 tally real) are constituted" (35-36).
 Longuenesse then turns this general framework to an account of
 Hegel's conceptions of contradiction, ground, and modality. Unfortunately,
 there is not room in a short review to dojustice to Longuenesse's many detailed
 arguments and insightful readings of Hegel's text. In particular, the discussion
 of ground is one of the very best in the literature. As a way of considering in
 somewhat more detail the application of the framework described above, con-
 sider Longuenesse's insightful expression of the relation between Hegel and
 Kant on modality:
 Hegel owes to Kant the idea that the modal categories express nothing
 other than the degree of unity between existence and a unified system of
 thought-determinations. But he opposes Kant in that for him, that unity
 leaves no room on the side of existence for a world of the beyond. And on
 the side of thought-determinations, the unity brought about by reflection
 is not that of an immutable subject faced with an object external to it.
 Rather, it is that of a thought process that is immanent to existence, and
 transformed in its very forms by its confrontation with multiplicity. (119)
 Though there is much to be said specifically for framing the relation between
 Hegel and Kant in this way, I do worry that the emphasis on unity versus multi-
 plicity partially obscures the radical nature of Hegel's thinking about contin-
 gency and modality in general. Hegel thinks of actuality as a form of expression
 or self-manifestation, and as such the primary danger is not multiplicity but
 rather externality as opposed to an internal orientation of expression. And
 though the oppositions between unity and multiplicity, on the one hand, and
 internality and externality, on the other hand, are closely related, whether the
 contingent is in itself unitary or dispersed is not directly relevant to its tendency
 to disorient the process of expression. The emphasis on the relation to Kant in
 Longuenesse's account obscures this feature in the same move in which it (ac-
 curately) highlights the greater internality of existence to reflection in Hegel's
 account. For example, "Of course it is true that thought cannot be satisfied with
 the contingent, since the latter manifests the impossibility of completely taking
 up the given into the synthesis of the 'I think'. The goal of thinking is to reduce
 contingency" (129). The emphasis in Longuenesse's account is on the pen-
 etration of the determinations of existence by thought, but the retaining of
 the generally Kantian schema of the opposition of the activity of thought to
 its objects seems to lead her to underestimate the penetration in the opposite
 direction (though it is clearly acknowledged in the longer passage quoted
 above, and in the recognition of Hegel's criticism of Leibniz as leaving "no
 room for the unpredictable character of the activity of determination and uni-
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 fication, for the play of the manifold against the unifying effort of thought"
 [133-34]). To extend a metaphor used by Longuenesse on the following
 page, even if the concept has "digested all otherness" (120), this digestion is
 just as much indigestion. So, for example, Longuenesse sees in Hegel's claim
 that the possible has being or existence the view that the actual becomes the
 criterion of possibility, which view introduces a form of contingency that is later
 absorbed by absolute necessity (126). On Longuenesse 's interpretation, the
 possible does not retain its character when it becomes coextensive with actuality
 and necessity (except as a kind of resistant multiplicity, where the distinction
 between actuality and possibility becomes a matter of external reflection that is
 subsequently eliminated in absolute modality) .
 Perhaps the deemphasis of internality and externality here is connected
 with Longuenesse 's own criticism of her early work, namely, that it treats Hegel's
 Logic as primarily theoretical rather than also practical (xix-xx), for surely the
 important function of Kant's moral law is to provide an internal principle of
 action, rather than unifying our natural capacities or inclinations. This has
 important consequences for Longuenesse's later view since a recognition of
 the important role of contingency and externality even in Hegel's most idealist
 conceptions of the Absolute substantially blunts the discomfort associated with
 his infinite standpoint, but that is an argument for another day. The work in
 Hegel's Crìtique of Metaphysics is of the highest quality and has the added biogra-
 phical benefit of showing two substantially different stages in Longuenesse's
 engagement with Kant and Hegel.
 Christopher Yeomans
 Purdue University
 Philosophical Review, Vol. 121, No. 3, 2012
 DOI 10.1215/00318108-1574499
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